Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

From: Presiding Officer 25 January 2005

To: SEN,MESUT

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SEN. MESUT

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, wim conditions agreedupon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee is a Belgium citizen that admitted to traveling from Germany, through Holland, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, to Jalalabad, Afghanistan in September 2000.
- 2. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan with approximately 2,000 to 2,500 U.S. dollars along with his Belgian passport.
- 3. The detainee's passport was taken for storage while at the Kandahar, Afghanistan guesthouse and he was given a new name.
- 4. The detainee was captured in a village near Peshar, Pakistan while trying to cross the border into Pakistan.
 - b. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee lived for nearly one year at a Taliban transit house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF **SEN, MESUT**

- 2. Detainee had connections to Millis Gorus, as did his father.
- 3. The Belgium Government considers Milli Gorus to be an extremist group and it is therefore banned from having representatives on the official representative board for Muslims in Belgium.

c. Other

- 1. The detainee was in possession of a Casio watch. The same model number of Casio watch found in the possession of the detainee has been frequently used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and other radical Islamic terrorist groups.
- 2. Emerging as a leader, the detainee has been leading the detainees around him in prayer. The detainees listen to him speak and follow his actions during prayer.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee admits that he contacted the Taliban office in Quetta in order to enter Afghanistan, but claimed he had no affiliation with the Taliban.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 May 2005

To: AZANI, SAAD MASIR MUKBL AL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZANI. SAAD MASIR MUKBL AL

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee studied recitation of the Koran at the Al Tabligh School and attended advanced religious school in order to learn religious science and become an Imam. The detainee also attended Dar Al Mustaffa College, where he studied religious science for two years.
- 2. The detainee traveled to Pakistan to further study religious science. The detainee's cousin funded his travel and provided him with \$100 United States Dollars. The detainee later gave the money to Sheikh Saleh Moqbil Rajeh at the school in Pakistan.
- 3. Saleh Ahmed Muqbels' request for permission for the detainee to preach Islam in Pakistan was found in a collection of materials linked to al Oaida.
- 4. The detainee lived and studied for two years at the Arabic Teachings College located east of Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee identified the institute where he studied as the Institute of Islamic Studies. According to the detainee, a Mauritanian named Abu Hafs ran the institute whose student population consisted primarily of Afghani and Philippine Taliban members.
 - 2. Abu Hafs Al Mauritania is an operational planner for al Qaida.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZANI, SAAD MASIR MUKBL AL

- 3. At the institute in Kandahar, the detainee attended a gathering where Usama Bin Laden gave a speech and talked to approximately thirty students.
- 4. One of the detainee's known aliases, along with passport information, was found on a list recovered during raids against al Qaida-associated safehouses.
- 5. The detainee was arrested with 14 others at an Arab guesthouse run by an al Qaida facilitator.

c. Intent

- 1. The detainee was a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden.
- 2. The detainee is a Tablique.
- 3. Jama' at Al Tablighi, a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization, is becoming increasingly radicalized, and is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.

d. Other Relevant Data

At the time of his arrest by the Pakistani police, the detainee had 1,200 United States Dollars in his possession.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee is not aware of any potential upcoming attacks against the United States or Western interests. The detainee is not aware of any potential al Qaida plans or operatives. The detainee stated that he has never been approached by anyone seeking assistance or money for terrorist related activities.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 April 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: NASSERI, RIYAD BIL MOHAMMED //TAHIR

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

NASSERI, RIYAD BIL MOHAMMED // TAHIR

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee left Italy in the mid-1990s for Bosnia where he received military training and participated in the war along side Bosnian mujahidin.
- 2. The detainee led a band of thieves in Italy and Spain who cooperated with Algerian terrorists.
 - 3. The detainee is a member of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).
- 4. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) is an Islamic extremist group that aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state.
- 5. The detainee was condemned in Italy for making and passing counterfeit money; had a warrant order issued for terrorism related crimes and subversion and has an international arrest order on record.
 - 6. The detainee was sentenced in Tunisia to a ten year sentence for being a member of a

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSERI, RIYAD BIL MOHAMMED // TAHIR

terrorist organization operating abroad.

- 7. The detainee, known as a Tunisian terrorist, supervised a guesthouse in Afghanistan.
- 8. The detainee was involved in establishing the Tunisian Combat Group.
- 9. The Tunisian Combat Group (TCG), also known as the Jama'a Combattante Tunisienne, reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and also targets US and Western interests. The group has come to be associated with al Qaida and other North African extremist networks that have been implicated in terrorist plots during the past two years.
 - 10. The detainee is considered one of the most dangerous Tunisian operatives.
 - 11. The detainee is also a known member of the Tunisian Islamic Front (FIT).
 - 12. The Tunisian Islamic Front (FIT) is suspected to be the armed wing of En-Nahda.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee received military framing at the Derunta camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and Khaldan camp near Khowst, Afghanistan.
 - 2. The detainee received framing on light arms while at the camps.
- 3. Derunta was one of Usama bin Laden's most important bases in Afghanistan. The camp provided training in the use of explosives and toxic chemical usage. Derunta also contained several secondary bases belonging to Usama bin Laden.
- 4. Khalidoun Camp or "Al Khalidoun" was supervised by Ibn Cheikh al-Libi. Training consisted primarily of tactics for escaping from rockets, the use of rocket launchers, the manufacture of explosives and training in destructive techniques (physical liquidation). The camp was well known for bringing in volunteers recruited from Norm Africa, many of whom had been living in Europe and transferred to Afghanistan via Karachi, Pakistan.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida lieutenant as having trained at Khaldan camp and eventually taking over as the Emir of the Tunisian Group in Afghanistan.

d. Intent

The detainee has hated America since he was a baby because it always takes the side of Israel. He stated that America will eventually receive justice for its crimes against Islam.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSERI, RIYAD BIL MOHAMMED // TAHIR

- e. Other relevant data
- 1. The detainee fled from Jalalabad, Afghanistan to the Tora Bora region after this area fell to the Northern Alliance.
 - 2. The detainee was injured in the Tora Bora region during the United States bombing.
 - 3. The detainee and others arranged their surrender.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee maintains that he never participated in, observed nor heard of any training in chemical or biological weapons while at the Darwanta Camp.
- b. The detainee stated he did not receive any training at or near Khost and had not heard of a terrorist training camp prior to this interview.
- c. The detainee claims not to have belonged to any Tunisian Islamist group and has never tried to overthrow the Tunisian government.
 - d. The detainee claims that he was never the leader of any group.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 May 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL ANAZI, SULTAN SARI SAYEL

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANAZI, SULTAN SARI SAYEL

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia; Bahrain; Karachi, Pakistan; Quetta, Pakistan; Kandahar, Afghanistan; Jalalabad, Afghanistan and finally Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee met a member of the Islamic-based organization, Jamaat Tabliq, who convinced him to travel to Afghanistan.
- 3. Jama'at Al Tabligh, a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
- 4. The detainee stated he had no specific reason for traveling from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan but felt he needed a change in his life. He eventually decided to go to Pakistan, explaining he had already been in most of the Arab speaking countries (Egypt, Syria and Lebanon).
 - b. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee's name was found on a list of "Trust Accounts" for al Qaida mujahidin

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANAZI, SULTAN SARI SAYEL

found in raids at al Qaida safehouses in Pakistan, 11 September 2002 and 1 March 2003.

- 2. Due to the detainee's associations with known al Qaida operatives the detainee's name has been preauthorized for placement in appropriate United States government agency watch lists.
- 3 The detainee's name and telephone number were on a list recovered from a safehouse raid associated with suspected al Qaida in Pakistan.
- 4. The leader of the detainee's group at Tora Bora was named Zubair. Zubair was a member of the Jama'at Al Tablique and was killed in Tora Bora by bombings from U.S. Forces.

c. Intent

- 1. The detainee came to Afghanistan to train but all of the camps were closed when he arrived.
- 2. The detainee has made anti-American statements claiming that there should especially ^z*I* be a jihad in America until all Americans are dead or Muslim. This is because America supports the Jews and infidels. He has also stated that it is every Muslim male's duty to go fight the jihad ^st and be a Mujahadeen. The detainee plans to go back to Saudi Arabia if released and join the ,! army just for the training and quit.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee fled to the Zubair Center in Tora Bora in November 2001 and was wounded in an air strike.
- 2. The detainee was captured by coalition forces while convalescing at an unknown location after fighting in the Tora Bora region.
- 3. While imprisoned at Sarapuza prison in Afghanistan the detainee collaborated with other prisoners to hide money in mattresses and bed frames in his prison cell.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee insisted he never went to Afghanistan because of a fatwa or to fight a jihad. He was not recruited nor did he receive financial or logistical assistance in traveling from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan. He stated he never received military training, he does not know any Taliban or al Qaida members and he has no knowledge of Taliban or al Qaida training.
- b. When asked about the September 11,2001 attacks the detainee stated that the killing of innocents, particularly women and children, is against the teachings of Islam. He also stated that

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATTV REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANAZI, SULTAN SARI SAYEL

if you have an enemy you fight that enemy specifically. You do not make war against civilians.

- c. The detainee stated he never made the statement about a jihad in America. There must have been a misunderstanding because he did not believe in killing someone simply because he was not Muslim.
- d. The detainee allegedly commented a Muslim's duty to jihad and his desire to kill nonbelievers and Americans. The detainee said that any comments made earlier would have been mistranslated.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 May 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AMEZIANE, DJAMEL SAIID ALI

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMEZIANE, DJAMEL SAIID ALI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to yourhome state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. In late 1995, the detainee traveled to Canada from Austria with a fake Dutch passport.
- 2. In late 2000, the detainee, who claims Algerian citizenship, traveled to Afghanistan from Canada on a fraudulent French passport.
- 3. The detainee traveled illegally to Pakistan without documentation and was captured by the Pakistani military at a mosque.
- 4. The detainee used an alias to hide his Algerian identity from Pakistani and U.S. military authorities.
 - b. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee attended the Al-Salaam mosque in Montreal, Canada.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMEZIANE, DJAMEL SAIID ALI

- 2. Prior to his departure from Canada, the detainee received 1,200 to 1,500 Canadian dollars from a Tunisian man who had encouraged the detainee to travel to Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee was instructed to go to a guesthouse in Kabul upon his arrival in Afghanistan, which the detainee ultimately followed.
- 4. The detainee noted that a number of the other residents of the guesthouse were Taliban fighters.
 - 5. The guesthouse in Kabul was run by an al Qaida communications specialist.
- 6. The detainee stayed in a guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan with a number of Arab men.
- 7. The detainee traveled with Taliban fighters through the Tora Bora mountains during the U.S. bombing campaign.

c. Intent

After residing in Canada illegally for five years, the detainee traveled from Canada to England and then to Iran and Afghanistan on a false French passport.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee escaped from a bus that was forcibly overtaken by other prisoners with the detainee, but was captured again a short time later by Pakistani authorities.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. While in Afghanistan, the detainee did not receive any military or terrorist training and did not see any fighting.
- b. The detainee denied ever having participated in any fighting or terrorist activity and denied he had any intention of participation in such activity if he is released. The detainee denied knowledge of future planned terrorist attacks in the United States and denied knowledge of the locations of terrorist training camps or the identity of individuals affiliated with al Qaida or other terrorist organizations.
- c. The detainee stated he left Canada because they would not grant him asylum. He was not even thinking of jihad when he moved to Afghanistan.
- d. The detainee decided to flee Afghanistan because the non-Taliban and the opposition were killing Arabs.
 - e. In the Tora Bora mountains the detainee did not see any type of military training being

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMEZIANE. DJAMEL SAIID ALI

conducted and he was never issued a weapon.

- f. The detainee stated, "I am not a member of al Qaida."
- g. The detainee denies ever viewing any extremist material or visiting any radical Islamic websites.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 Apr 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL QADASI,KHALIDABDJAL//JABBAR MUHAMMAD JUTHMAN

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL QADASI, KHALID ABD JAL // JABBAR MUHAMMAD JUTHMAN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee is a Yemeni citizen who traveled to Afghanistan via Yemen; Karachi, Pakistan; Qandahar, Afghanistan and finally to Kabul, Afghanistan in July 2001.
 - 2. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to fight in the Jihad.
- 3. The detainee was identified as a Mujadeen lighter who came to Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
 - b. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee stayed in a Taliban guesthouse in Quetta, Pakistan and an Arab guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - 2. The detainee visited the Daftar Taliban in Quetta, Pakistan.
 - 3. The Daftar Taliban is a Taliban office in Quetta. The office provides assistance to

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QADASI, KHALID ABD JAL // JABBAR MUHAMMAD JUTHMAN

Arabs crossing the border into Afghanistan by coordinating travel and lodging.

- 4. The detainee stayed at a guesthouse in Kabul owned by Hamza ((Al-Ghamdi)).
- 5. Hamza Al-((Ghamdi)) was a member of al Qaida's Guesthouse Subcommittee responsible for the organization and operation of al-Qaida guesthouses inside Afghanistan. Hamza al-((Ghamdi)) was responsible for the Kabul guesthouses handling all matters regarding housing for al-Qaida, including both those who come for training and designated visitors.
 - 6. The detainee was recruited by Juhayna.
- 7. Johaina was a PT instructor and was responsible for the mess hall at the al Farouq training camp.
 - 8. The detainee was met in Karachi, Pakistan by a Saudi known as Ali ((Mahmud).
 - 9. Ali Mahoud is a possible al Qaida recruiter.
- 10. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Pakistan.
- 11. The detainee's name was found on a document listing al Qaida mujahidin and the contents of their "trust" accounts recovered during raids against al Qaida associated safehouses in Pakistan.
 - c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee and his leaders retreated to the Pakistani border where they surrendered to Pakistani troops.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee alleges he went to Afghanistan as a tourist for a two-month vacation and went alone for medical reasons.
 - b. The detainee denied he was a Mujahidin fighter who came to Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
- c. The detainee claims he never possessed any weapons in Afghanistan, as he was unable to fight due to his bad back.
 - d. The detainee stated he did not participate in any fighting in Afghanistan.
 - e. The detainee stated he was not a member of the al Qaida organization.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL QADASI, KHALID ABD JAL // JABBAR MUHAMMAD JUTHMAN

f. The detainee said he never heard or saw anything related to Usama Bin Laden while at the Hamza ((AL Ghamdi)) Safehouse.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 May 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL MOUSA, ABDtJL HAKIM ABDUL//RAHMAN ABDUAZIZ

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL MOUSA, ABDUL HAKIM ABDUL // RAHMAN ABDUAZIZ

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee is a Saudi citizen who traveled to Afghanistan for combat training.
- 2. The detainee was recruited from Saudi Arabia to come to Afghanistan. The recruiter introduced the detainee to the safehouse system. The detainee spent time at safe houses in Quetta, Kandahar, and Khost.
 - b. Training

The Detainee received military training for a month at a house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was arrested with several al Qaida members including

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MOUSA, ABDUL HAKIM ABDUL // RAHMAN ABDUAZIZ

part of the al Qaida network responsible for moving Arabs to and from Afghanistan.

- 3. One of the individuals the detainee was captured with was escorted by a senior al Qaida lieutenant to a meeting where he presented money to Usama Bin Laden. This individual also attended the Farooq training camp.
- 4. One of the individuals the detainee was captured with attended Camp Farouq and was present at a speech given by Usama Bin Laden at the camp.
- 5. One of the individuals the detainee was captured with held a high-ranking position in the Taliban.
- 6. Information strongly suggests that the detainee may be identifiable with senior personnel of al Wafa. Executive Order 13224 designates al Wafa as a global terrorist entity.
 - d. Other Relevant Data

While in the Khost safehouse, the detainee had four passport stamps forged.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detained having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
- b. The detainee provided three reasons for his travel to Afghanistan: he wanted to defend himself against thieves, defend Saudi Arabia, and learn how to shoot a weapon for the purpose of hunting.
- c. A foreign government delegation deemed the detainee to be of low intelligence or law enforcement value to the United States, and unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the United States or its interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent iyou in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 April 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: RAHMAN, MOHAMMED ABDUL

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMAN, MOHAMMED ABDUL

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee left Italy for Pakistan in 1998.
- 2. The detainee lived in and traveled back and forth between Pakistan and Afghanistan until his detention in Ouetta, Pakistan.
- 3. The detainee met Pakistanis from the ICI Mosque in Milan who were trying to recruit people to go to Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- 4. The Islamic Cultural Institute was known as the ICI. This mosque was shut down by Italian authorities for housing the Sami Essid Ben Khemais network, which is the core for the Tunisian Combat Group (TCG) in Italy.
 - 5. The detainee frequented a Tunisian guesthouse while living in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 6. The Tunisian guesthouse was operated by a Tunisian cell with possible ties to al-Qaida.
- 7. The detainee stayed at a guesthouse, which is associated with individuals who have trained at al Qaida camps.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMAN, MOHAMMED ABDUL

b. Association

- 1. The detainee admitted associating with various known terrorists in Jalalabad and Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - 2. The detainee participated in establishing the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG).
- 3. The detainee was a member of the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG) Advisory Council.
- 4. The Department of Homeland Security lists the Tunisian Combatant Group as a terrorist organization.

c. Intent

- 1. The detainee has admitted to having an illegal passport.
- 2. The detainee has an extensive criminal record with the Italian authorities.
- 3. The detainee admits he has used over 50 aliases between 1988 and 1998.
- 4. The detainee is reportedly a member of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).
- 5. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) is a terrorist organization.

d. Training

- 1. The detainee was conscripted into the Tunisian military at around the age of 20; and served one year mandatory service in Tunis, Tunisia. The detainee learned to fire a rifle while in the Tunisian military but did not receive any other type of formal military training.
- 2. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida lieutenant as having studied at Khaldan Camp in 1998 or 1999.
- 3. Khaldan Camp provided training to include but not limited to: basic military training, mortars, explosives, and first aid.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee says he was not in Pakistan for Jihad and no one he associated with was involved in Jihad.
 - b. The detainee denied knowing any terrorists in Italy and denied being a terrorist.
 - c. The detainee states that he went to Afghanistan because the Pakistani government started a

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMAN, MOHAMMED ABDUL campaign against Arabs.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

02 May 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: MOQBILL, MUHSIN MUHAMMAD // MUSHEEN

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

MOQBILL, MUHSIN MUHAMMAD // MUSHEEN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban in response to a fatwa issued by Sheik Hamoud Aluoqla of Saudi Arabia.
- 2. Sheikh Hamud (Al-Uqqla) is a Saudi Mufti who issued a fatwa calling for Jihad in Afghanistan, and encouraged people to fight Jihad against the Christians and Jews. Al-Uqqla condoned the 11 September 2001 against the United States and helped raise money for Usama Bin Laden until the sheikh's death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.
- 3. The detainee was told by Ibrihim Baalawi (Kunya- Abu Khouloud) that this fatwa was issued to get Arabs to fight with the Taliban to form a "True" Muslim state.
- 4. The detainee was given, by Khouloud, a passport, a Pakistani Visa, a Yemen Air ticket (from Sana to Dubai), and \$50.00 U.S. currency. He also provided the detainee with detailed travel information for his trip Karachi, Pakistan.
- 5. The detainee traveled to an area of the front line near Bagram, Afghanistan referred to as the Mullah Ibrahiem Center. He remained there for 11-12 months and observed tank and

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

MOQBILL, MUHSIN MUHAMMAD // MUSHEEN

artillery skirmishes with the Northern Alliance.

6. The detainee maintained a Taliban post in the vicinity of Jalalabad, Afghanistan after 11 September 2001.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee attended the al Farouq camp for weapons training with the Kalashnikov rifle, PK machine gun, and the rocket propelled grenade (RPG).
 - 2. The detainee was personally trained by the head of the al Farouq camp.
 - c. Connection/Associations
- 1. The detainee was associated with Ibrahim Ba'alawi also known as Abu Khalud who also lived in Ta'iz, Yemen and actively recruited individuals to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan.
 - 2. The detainee stayed in the Taliban Center in Quetta, Pakistan.
 - d. Intent

The detainee knew his role was a soldier on the lines. At first, he worried about being killed then later "he did not care".

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee traveled to a small village in the Tora Bora mountains and remained there for twenty-six (26) days before crossing the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to a small village where he surrendered his weapon. The detainee walked to a second Pakistani village where he was taken into custody by Pakistani authorities.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee was upset that he was misled by Abu Khloud (aka: Ibraheim Ba'alawi) into doing jihad in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he did not know the Taliban were fighting against Americans but did know they were fighting the Northern Alliance. The detainee stated he opposed Usama Bin Laden (UBL) because Usama bin Laden's (UBL) actions were against the Islamic religion. The detainee said he made a mistake by going to Afghanistan and will not make that same mistake. The detainee denied ever being part of al Qaida or ever taking part in any planning against Americans. When released, he will attend a university and study mathematics or physics.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOQBILL, MUHSIN MUHAMMAD // MUSHEEN

- b. The detainee described al-Qaida and anyone associated with Usama Bin Laden as "criminals" and blames them for his current predicament. He "hated" Afghanistan and curses the day he set foot in Afghanistan. He did not want to discuss anything regarding Afghanistan. The detainee denied any affiliation with al-Qaeda or anyone associated with Usama Bin Laden.
- c. The detainee stated he has never been asked to pledge a bayat, or oath. He maintains that his only knowledge of al Qaida is through Al Jazeera television broadcasts. The detainee stated he would be willing to undergo a polygraph examination.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 April 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL SHABLI, ABDULLAH YAHIA // YOUSF

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIF IED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL SHABLI, ABDULLAH YAHIA // YOUSF

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. In August 2001, the detainee flew from San'a Yemen to Iran. He traveled through Iran to Herat, Afghanistan and then on to Qandahar. The detainee was recruited to go to al Farouq training camp by a Mujahedin fighter who had fought in Afghanistan.
- 2. The recruiter gave the detainee a false Yemeni passport, travel funds, tickets and locations of guesthouses in Afghanistan.
 - 3. The detainee was captured fleeing the Tora Bora Mountains.

b. Training

- 1. In 2001 the detainee traveled to Afghanistan for Jihad. While in Afghanistan he attended al Farouk training camp where he trained on the Kalashnikov rifle, Siminov rifle, and Rocket-Propelled Grenade.
- 2. The detainee received weapons training on anti-aircraft machine guns at the Malek Center in Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHABLI. ABDULLAH YAHIA // YOUSF

3. The Malek Center in Kabul, Afghanistan, logistically supports the Taliban by providing weapons training to foreign fighters, vehicle maintenance, and lodging for soldiers assigned to the frontlines.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee resided at a layover safehouse in Kandahar named Bin Zubair Hani on Haj Habash Street.
- 2. Abu Zubair (Bin Zubair) was the leader of al Qaida guesthouses in Kandahar named after the martyrs who carried out the USS Cole terrorist attack. Used for new recruits on their way to receive training and veterans cycling out, these guesthouses were located near the Haj Habbash Mosque in Kandahar.
- 3. The detainee stayed at two different houses in Kabul; the al-Kuaiti House and the Hamza Al-Ghamdi House.
- 4. Al Ghamdi is one of Usama Bin Laden's most trusted people and reported directly to Usama Bin Laden.
 - 5. The detainee stated he saw Usama Bin Laden passing by in the Tora Bora Mountains.
- 6. The detainee's name was on a list of al Qaida mujahidin and the contents of their "trust" accounts found in an al Qaida associated safehouse in Pakistan.

d. Intent

The detainee traveled to Afghanistan for jihad and was issued an AK-47 and three full 30-round magazines for combat use by his commander in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

e. Detainee Conduct

The detainee has been cited on several occasions for harassing the guards and for one hostile act against a guard.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated that he was unaware of any Taliban or al Qaida personnel associated with either the al Farouq Camp or the Malek Center.
- b. The detained having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11,2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - c. The detainee had no knowledge of how the Taliban or al Qaida forces procured weapons,

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHABLI, ABDULLAH YAHIA // YOUSF

nor did he have any information on weapons sales and trafficking.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 April 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: HAWSAWI, UMRAN BAKR // MUHAMMAD

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

HAWSAWI, UMRAN BAKR // MUHAMMAD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee admitted knowing that Sheik Amoud Shouib Ouqula in Saudi Arabia had issued a Fatwa for Muslims to go and fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan.
- 2. Sheikh Hamud ((Al-Uqqla)) is a Saudi Mufti who issued a Fatwa calling for jihad against Christians and Jews. Al-Uqqla condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States of America.
- 3. The detainee decided to travel to an Afghani refugee camp sometime in September 2001 after hearing of the war in that area.
- 4. The detainee was in the camp when the United States bombardment began and he sustained shrapnel injuries.
 - b. Training
 - 1. The detainee was identified to be in Kabul, Afghanistan training at the al Farouq camp.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HA WS A WI, UMRAN B AKR // MUHAMMAD

2. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan for the training.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Damascus, Syria, then to Tehran, Iran, then to Mashad, Iran before crossing the border into Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee attempted to enter Afghanistan legally but he was turned back by Iranian officials. He did eventually sneak across the border, aided by another individual.
- 3. Prior to being turned over to U.S. Forces, detainee surrendered his passport in Quetta while he was staying at the Saudi Red Crescent Hospital.
 - 4. The detainee's passport had altered stamps which indicates a possible al Qaida connection.
- 5. A senior al Qaida lieutenant stated that the detainee is a member of al Qaida. The detainee is on the media committee along with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM).

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee has committed two assaults which consisted of throwing food, milk, tea, water and body fluids on the MPs. He has also harassed the guards by telling them to die and making threatening gestures at them.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee said he traveled to Afghanistan to teach the Koran and to fulfill the Koran's religious principles.
- b. The detainee denied any knowledge of training camps in Afghanistan or of the al Qaida organization.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 Apr 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL SHAMYRI, MUSTAFA ABDUL // QAWI ABDUL AZIZ

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL SHAMYRI, MUSTAFA ABDUL //QAWI ABDUL AZIZ

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. In January 2001, the detainee decided to travel from Yemen to Afghanistan during Ramadan, following the fatwa of Sheik Hamoud Al Ukla Aqula. He flew from San'aa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan after buying a plane ticket with his own money and money from Salam Al Hadrami.
- 2. Sheik Hamoud al Uqqula is a Saudi Mufti who issued fatwas and encouraged people to fight Jihad against Christians and Jews. Al Uqqula condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States. In addition, he helped raise money for Usama Bin Laden until his death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.
- 3. While in the frontlines near Konduz, Afghanistan, the detainee attended a lecture given by Usama Bin Laden.
- 4. The detainee retreated with his unit from Konduz to Mazar-e-Sharif, where coalition forces captured him approximately 26 November 2001.
 - b. Training

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHAMYRI, MUSTAFA ABDUL // QAWI ABDUL AZIZ

- 1. A detained al Qaida official identified the detainee as a Yemeni national who participated in the Bosnian Jihad and received specialized training in Kabul, Afghanistan. Furthermore, he stated the detainee was a frequent visitor of an al Qaida guesthouse in Kabul.
- 2. The detainee received ten days of small arms training at a volunteer camp near Shabour, Yemen. Training was performed on the AK-47, DSHK-38, RPG's and the PK machine gun.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. When the detainee arrived in Kandahar he was received by Abdul Salam al Hadrami, his facilitator from Yemen.
- 2. Abdul Salam al Hadrami was identified as a Yemeni al-Qaida Member, who was believed to be in Afghanistan as of 15 December 2001.
- 3. The detainee fully admits he was supposed to attend training at al Farouk Camp, but training was not mandated because al Hadrami vouched for detainee's previous training.

d. Intent

- 1. The detainee served approximately six months in the frontlines at Omar Saif Center.
- 2. The detainee served approximately six months in the frontlines in the vicinity of Konduz, Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee stated that, killing in the name of Jihad is acceptable and that his friends had killed more people than he had.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was part of the Taliban surrender at Konduz, Afghanistan and subsequently was taken to Mazar-e-Sharif for detention but did not witness the uprising.

f. Detainee Conduct

The detainee assaulted the guards by throwing food on the guard force. The detainee was cited for harassing guards, inciting disturbances and several hostile acts.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL SHAMYRI, MUSTAFA ABDUL // QAWI ABDUL AZIZ

internal uprisings at the Guantanamo detention facility, with negative results.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

From: Presiding Officer 27 January 2005

To: BEN MOUJAN, MUHAMMAD

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF **BEN MOUJAN, MUHAMMAD**

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. While in Afghanistan, the detainee engaged in Jihad in the Tora Bora region.
 - b. Training
- 1. The detainee participated in weapons training in the mountains north of Qandahar, AF, where he learned how to operate and clean an AK-47.
 - 2. The detainee attended training at a terrorist training camp.
 - c. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee affiliated himself with Muslim fighters in Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee admitted he tried to join with other Arab fighters prior to the $0\,0\,1\,0\,7\,8$ commencement of the Coalition air raids.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEN MOUJAN, MUHAMMAD

- 3. The detainee was captured while attempting to escape to Pakistan with other Arab fighters.
 - 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. Exculpatory
- 1. The detainee did not know of the concept of jihad when he left for Afghanistan.
- 2. The first time the detainee heard of al Qaida was when he was later imprisoned in Pakistan.
 - 3. The detainee has never engaged in combat.
 - 4. The detainee stated his training at the mountain camp was for self-protection.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 May 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: SALEH NASER, ABDUL RAHMAN // MOHAMED

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

SALEH NASER, ABDUL RAHMAN // MOHAMED

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan after hearing and speaking with Sheik Al Zindani.
- 2. Abd Al MajidZandani was an active supporter of Usama Bin Laden. Zandaniwas involved in raising funds and recruiting volunteers for the Bin Laden organization. Zandani is also a religious and legal expert for Usama Bin Laden.
- 3. Executive Order 13224 designates Shaykh Abd Al Majid Al Zindani as a person who commits, threatens to commit, or supports terrorism.
 - 4. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in Jan 2001 from Yemen via Syria and Iran.
 - b. Training'

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEH NASER, ABDUL RAHMAN // MOHAMED

The detainee received training from Emir Abdul Salam on the Karabak front lines, along with forty other troops.

- c. Connections / Associations
 - 1. The detainee's immediate commander was Turab al Najdi.
- 2. Abu Turab Al Najdi attended the Khaldan training camp in Afghanistan, and worked with the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines.
- 3. Abdul Salam served as a commander at the front lines for Abdul Hadi Al Iraqi, an al Qaida commander who worked for the Taliban government.
- 4. An audiocassette tape from Abd Alsalam addressed to Abd Alhadi, contained a greeting from Usama Bin Laden to his commanders, specifically Alhadi and Alsalam. Usama Bin Laden also stated on the tape that there would be a second and third very painful strike against America similar to that witnessed on 11 September 2001.
 - d. Intent
 - 1. The detainee went to Afghanistan to "fight".
 - 2. The detainee fought against the coalition at the Kabarak line.
 - 3. The detainee spent six months with a fighting unit at Khavjeh Gar.
 - e. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee's unit was captured by Dostum's Northern Alliance forces at Mazir-E-Shariff.
- 2. The detainee has been cited for numerous incidents of failure to comply, guard harassment, assault, and inciting of disturbances during his detention.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
- b. The detainee denies seeing Usama Bin Laden while in Afghanistan. The detainee stated that if he were released, he would return home to the family farm and get married.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEH NASER, ABDUL RAHMAN // MOHAMED

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 May 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL BAHUTH, ZIYAD SALIH // MUHAMMAD

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL BAHUTH, ZIYAD SALIH // MUHAMMAD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee traveled from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Kabul, Afghanistan with 90,000 Saudi Riyals (~\$24,000 USD) and claimed to do so to help the poor and needy.
- 2. The detainee took a bus from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Damascus, Syria and then traveled by plane to Tehran, Iran from which he took a bus to Meshad, Afghanistan. Detainee then boarded a bus that traveled to Herat, Afghanistan and finally to Kabul, Afghanistan.

b. Training

The detainee spent one and a half months at a Taliban training center located outside Kabul, Afghanistan where he received one week of training with an AK-47 rifle.

- c. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee spent his time in Kabul with a known Taliban member.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BAHUTH, ZIYAD SALIH // MUHAMMAD

- 2. The detainee thinks the Taliban member gave the detainee weapons training in order to get him to join al Qaida.
- 3. Weapons training was given to the detainee by the Taliban member in an attempt to recruit the detainee for the Taliban.
- 4. One of the detainee's known aliases was on a list of captured al Qaida members that was discovered on a computer hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.
- 5. The detainee's name was found on a floppy disk recovered from raids of a suspected al Qaida safehouse.
- 6. The detainee's name appears on a computer file seized during joint raids conducted with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) against al Qaida-associated safehouses in Rawalpindi in March 2003.
- 7. The detainee's name was found on a computer hard drive seized from members of a suspected al Qaida terrorist cell involved in an attack on U.S Marines on Faylaka Island in October 2002.
- 8. The detainee's name, nationality and his possession of a Saudi passport was found on a document recovered from the raid of a suspected al Qaida safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 9. An al Qaida associate identified the detainee as arriving in Afghanistan in 2000 and fighting in the Omar Sa'if Center north of Kabul.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured by the Pakistani government after crossing the border in the Nangahar Province in December of 2001.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee said he did not join the Taliban, al Qaida, or any relief organization.
- b. The detainee said he would not sacrifice anything for Usama Bin Laden, al Qaida, the Taliban, or any relief organization.
- c. The detainee said Usama Bin Laden is wrong for the terrorist acts for which he is responsible.
- d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks on the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests*

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL BAHUTH, ZIYAD SALIH // MUHAMMAD

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

02 May 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL BIDNA, SA AD IBRAHAM SA AD

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIDNA, SA AD IBRAHAM SA AD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Iran via Syria during the summer of 2001.
 - 2. Pakistani officials arrested the detainee late November or early December 2001.
- 3. The detainee's confinement history includes several incidents of failure to comply, hostile acts and guard harassment.
 - b. Connections / Associations
 - 1. The detainee associated with a Saudi providing relief to a refugee organization.
 - 2. The same Saudi facilitated the detainee's illegal entry into Pakistan.
 - 3. The Saudi is a known operative for al Wafa.
- 4. Executive Order 13224, which blocks property and prohibits transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism, designates al Wafa as a global terrorist entity.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BEDNA, SA AD BRAHAM SA AD

c. Intent

The detainee admitted to being a terrorist.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. During the interview where the detainee admitted to being a terrorist, he was frustrated, extremely mad and being sarcastic. During this interview he threw his hands up and said, "All right, you got me, I'm a terrorist".
- b. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
- c. Representatives of a foreign government believe that the detainee has low intelligence or law enforcement value to the United States and is unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the United States or its interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

03 May 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: KERIMBAKIEV, ABDULRAHIM

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KERIMBAKIEV, ABDULRAHIM

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan from Kazakhstan in September 2000.
- 2. Detainee's travel route took him through Karachi, Islamabad and Peshawar, Pakistan and through Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 - 3. The detainee was recruited by the Taliban in Kazakhstan.
 - 4. The detainee was captured in December 2001 at his house in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - b. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee has family ties to known terrorists in Pakistan.
- 2. One of detainee's "family ties" is a member of a terrorist group responsible for attacks in Uzbekistan.
- 3. The detainee is a member of the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Party/Movement (ETIP/ETIM).

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KERIMBAKIEV, ABDULRAHIM

- 4. The detainee and his family were financially supported by the Taliban and resided in Taliban provided housing. In October 2001, the detainee departed Kabul, Afghanistan to work as a cook at a Taliban Military Camp.
- 5. The detainee and the individuals he traveled with, chose a cover story for their recruitment in Kazakhstan.

c. Other Relevant Data

Anti-Taliban Forces in Kabul, Afghanistan captured the detainee and seven other al Qaida members; there were also 3 anti-aircraft missiles confiscated at the time.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any terrorist affiliation or information about terrorist activities directed or planned against the United States. He further denied knowing about anyone possibly having such information.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

02 May 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: LAGHA, LUFTI BIN SWEI

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LAGHA, LUFTI BIN SWEI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee stole a boat to enter Italy illegally with an Egyptian and another Tunisian.
 - 2. After arriving in Italy, the detainee used a false identification card.
- 3. The detainee traveled from Italy to Afghanistan via Iran arriving in April 2001 after being inspired to perform jihad.
- 4. The detainee paid cash for his tickets to Afghanistan and took \$2,500 U.S. currency with him.
- 5. The detainee was recruited at a mosque in Italy. The recruiter provided him a travel route and a Tunisian contact in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 6. The Tunisian contact ran a training camp near Lake Duruanta prior to 2001. The contact owned a house which was co-located with the former training camp.
- 7. The Tunisian contact took care of the detainee's accommodations for six months. During this time, the detainee became acquainted with two other Tunisian nationals.

DMO Exhibit

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LAGHA, LUFTI BIN SWEI

- 8. One of these Tunisians is a reported member of the terrorist group GIA (Armed Islamic Group).
- 9. The other had an extremist group which operated in Darunta and was connected to a known terrorist group, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.
- 10. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin are designated terrorist organizations. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin ran terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. They have staged attacks in an attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee was trained to use an automatic Austrian rifle in the Tunisian Military.
- 2. The detainee was sent by the head of a terrorist network for military training in Afghanistan. He traveled with a companion to Afghanistan in early 2001.
 - 3. This companion is a member of a terrorist network and a convicted terrorist.
 - 4. The detainee received training at a paramilitary training camp.

c. Connection/Associations

- 1. The detainee associated with several Tunisians at a cultural center in Northern Italy and frequented elements of the Jama'at al Tablighi.
- 2. Jama'at al Tablighi, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
- 3. Among those who frequented the cultural center was at least one individual that belonged to a terrorist network that ensures financial support to terrorist groups while also actively recruiting for Usama Bin Laden sponsored training camps in Afghanistan.
 - 4 The detainee was hired by an individual who ran a Cultural Center in Milan.
- 5 The institute and the individual who ran the institute are linked to various Islamic extremist groups.
- 6. The detainee knew an alleged al Qaida member in Europe who frequented a mosque in Milan.
 - 7. The detainee saw members of the Taliban while in Afghanistan.

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d. Intent

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EXJDENCE OR DMJMSJEAIIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE HILLIH HIL

After his arrest, the detainee told others that he was coming from the mountains of Tora Bora.

- 4. The Mowing primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. Detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan as a tourist
- b. During his stay in Afghanistan, the detainee said that he spent his time fishing and recreating, and remained in Jalalabad the entire time. Once the war started he left Afghanistan.
- c. Detainee stated that he is a Sunni but he does not practice any particular belief system in Islam. He does not follow any particular person. He thinks al Qaida's belief system is strange and that they are not good.
- d. Detainee stated that he doesn't have anything against the United States and he has no affiliation or knowledge of Usama bin Laden.
- e. Detainee claimed he never was a fighter, never took up arms against the Americans or anyone else, and never trained in a camp in Afghanistan.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically ptresent at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. Tfce AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 April 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: OURGY, ABDUL BIN MOHAMMED BIN // ABESS

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

OURGY, ABDUL BIN MOHAMMED BIN // ABESS

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee left Tunisia due to the fact that he was a Muslim extremist.
- 2. While living in Milan, Italy, the detainee lived with Abu Abdullah. They watched videos of the jihad in Bosnia and exchanged propaganda materials.
- 3. Abu Abdullah, a Tunisian, provided the detainee money and a ticket and told the detainee to go to Afghanistan.
 - b. Training
- 1. The detainee is a Tunisian national who traveled to Italy, then to Afghanistan where he received training at the Durunta military camp.
 - 2. Durunta is an al Qaida military training camp.
- 3. The detainee spent twenty-eight days at the camp where he participated in Kalashnikov rifle, pistol, rocket propelled grenade (RPG), and grenade training. **00109**

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OURGY, ABDUL BIN MOHAMMED BIN // ABESS

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee spent time with a man associated with an organization whose objective is to overthrow a foreign government and create a purely Islamic state.
 - 2. The detainee may have supported a terrorist plot using poisoned gas.
 - 3. The detainee was responsible for the finances of the Tunisian Combatant Group.
- 4. The Department of Homeland Security's Terrorist Organization Reference Guide lists the Tunisian Combatant Group as seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets United States and Western interests. The group is associated with al Qaida.
- 5. Abu Abdullah arranged the detainee's travel and instructed him to meet a man named Saif at the Islamabad Airport. Saif took the detainee to a house in Peshawar, where the detainee lived for about one month with former Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) fighters.
- 6. After attending Durunta Camp, Saif took the detainee back to a house in Pakistan, where two Libyans advised the detainee not to go back to Italy.
- 7. The two Libyans had been part of a Libyan Fighting Group operating against the Russians in Afghanistan.
- 8. A senior al Qaida lieutenant said, the detainee may have traveled with the Emir of the Tunisian Group, Abu Dujana al Tunisi, to Tora Bora.
- 9. The detainee identified the location of Nejim al-Jihad, an al Qaida housing compound owned by Usama Bin Laden.

d. Intent

- 1. The detainee fought with al Qaida in the mountains of Tora Bora.
- 2. The detainee was identified as Adel Al Tunesi, an explosives trainer for al Qaida.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee has assaulted the guards by spitting and throwing food on them on seven occasions. He has threatened to hit and kick the guards and participated in a block riot.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OURGY, ABDUL BIN MOHAMMED BIN // ABESS

- a. Detainee claims to have no involvement in the assassination of Commander Massoud, of the Northern Alliance.
- b. Detainee claims he traveled to Afghanistan so that he could receive military training for the Bosnian or Chechnyan jihad.
- c. Detainee claims that he did not attend a meeting between the Tunisian Combat Group and Usama Bin Laden and had never heard of the Tunisian Combat Group.
 - d. Detainee denies that he trained at the Khalden training camp.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 May 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL YAZIDI, RIDAH BIN SALEH

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL YAZIDI, RIDAH BIN SALEH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee attended the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan. One of the leaders of the mosque was Sheikh Anwar Sha'ban who spoke frequently of the Jihad ongoing in Bosnia. Sheikh Anwar Sha'ban was subsequently killed in the fighting in Jihad in Bosnia.
- 2. The Italian Islamic Cultural Institute, referred to as ICI, was shut down by Italian authorities for housing the Sami Essid Ben Khemais network, which is the core for the Tunisian Combat Group in Italy.
- 3. The detainee decided to join the Jihad in Afghanistan in 1996. He was influenced in his decision by Sheikh Soubeihi, an Egyptian, who spoke at the Mosque in Milan and Sheikh Sihnan Al Ouda Abdullah Azzan. Once he made this decision, the detainee began saving money and intensifying his religious studies.
- 4. Abudallah Azzan stated that individuals should follow Usama bin Laden by imitating his devotion to Islamic Jihad, both physically and financially.
 - 5. The detainee was identified by Italian authorities as a member of the Armed Islamic

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL YAZIDI. RIDAH BIN SALEH

Group (GIA). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Terrorist Organization Reference Guide identifies the GIA as a terrorist organization.

- 6. The detainee said he was provided with a letter of introduction for admission to the Khalden Training Camp. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan using a forged passport. The detainee traveled to Khost, Afghanistan via Switzerland, Islamabad, Pakistan and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 7. The detainee fought on the front lines in Karabel, Khwaja Ghar and Bagram, Afghanistan from March 2001 to November 2001.
 - 8. The detainee admitted to fighting against U.S. and Northern Alliance forces.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee spent nine months at the Khalden military training camp, from May 1999 to February 2000, undergoing extensive training to include rocket-propelled grenade launchers, Kalishnikov rifle, machine guns, pistols, explosives, mountain and urban warfare.
- 2. The detainee received additional explosives training in Jalalabad, Afghanistan which involved the manufacture of explosives using fertilizer and ammonium.

c. Connection/Associations

- 1. The detainee was recruited by Moussa at the ICI Mosque in Milan, Italy. Moussa also recruited the first Emir of the Tunisian Combat Group (TCG) to go to Afghanistan.
 - 2. The detainee received explosives training from Abu Khabab, an Egyptian.
- 3. Abu Khabab is an Egyptian-born al Qaida explosives trainer who instructed jihadists on improvised explosive devices in Jalalabad, Afghanistan in 2000.
 - 4. The detainee stayed at the Tunisian house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 5. A Tunisian terrorist cell, with possible ties to al Qaida, operated a Tunisian guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 6. The detainee stayed at an al Qaida guesthouse in Khandahar, Afghanistan during the Spring of 2000 for approximately two weeks.
- 7. The detainee was captured by Pakistani authorities along with thirty other Arabs, a number of them suspected of being bodyguards for Usama Bin Laden.

d. Intent

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL YAZIDI, RIDAH BIN SALEH

- a. The detainee denied charges by foreign government authorities. The detainee stated he was not a member of GIA and he did not know anything about any terrorist activity associated with the 1998 World Cup Soccer tournament.
- b. The detainee denies receiving any counter-interrogation training while at Khaldan Training Camp or the other camp he attended.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

02 May 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: RUHANI, GHOLAM

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RUHANI, GHOLAM

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. Detainee admitted being a member of the Taliban. A supervisor of Taliban Civilian Intelligence recruited the detainee into the Taliban.
- 2. Detainee served as the driver for a Taliban Intelligence Service member and performed clerical work for the Intelligence Service in Kabul, AF, from 1999 or 2000 until his capture by U.S. forces in December of 2001. The detainee was required to carry a pistol in this job.
- 3. Detainee was captured with a senior Taliban intelligence member, Abdul Haq Wasiq, by U.S. forces on 9 December 2001. The detainee was in possession of 7.62MM rounds when captured.
 - 4. During confinement the detainee has made death threats to guards.
 - b. Connections / Associations
- 1. For years the detainee worked for the Taliban in the Operations Department of the Ministry of Intelligence in Kabul. The detainee supervised several associates.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RUHANI, GHOLAM

- 2. The detainee and his 13-14 associates were members of a quasi-police organization affiliated with Taliban Internal Affairs. The detainee and others in the unit were armed.
 - 3. The detainee's sister is married to a Taliban Intelligence Officer.
- 4. The Taliban Chief of Intelligence led a group of 600 to 700 armed Taliban fighters in an Afghan province.
- 5. The detainee couriered a letter between the Taliban Chief of Intelligence and a Taliban military commander.
- 6. The Taliban military commander is associated with Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (KG). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Terrorist Organization Reference Guide, states that HIG has long established ties with Usama Bin Laden and has staged attacks in attempts to force United States troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

c. Intent

After the fall of Kabul the detainee and his associates fled the city in a pick-up truck armed with two RPG-7's, twenty AK-47's and two PK machine guns.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee claims his involvement with the Taliban should not be viewed as synonymous to the Taliban's ideology. The detainee claims he joined the Taliban because it was a matter of political and survival necessity.
- b. The detained having knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 Apr 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: YACOUB, MOHAMMED

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YACOUB, MOHAMMED

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment

The detainee heard that a Jihad had begun against the Northern Alliance and traveled back to Kandahar, Afghanistan, to join the Taliban.

b. Training

The detainee received Taliban training at a compound and learned how to use an AK-47.

- c. Intent
- 1. The detainee fought against the Northern Alliance. During the fighting the detainee was shot in the in the left arm. Following medical treatment for the wound, the detainee returned to a Taliban-controlled compound.
 - 2. The detainee was a guide for foreign fighters at a Taliban house in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - d. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee was sponsored into a missionary group (Tablighi) when he was in

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YACOUB, MOHAMMED

Pakistan.

- 2. Jama'at Al Tablighi, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
- 3. The detainee admitted his connection to Mullah Satar, a forward commander for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
- 4. Mullah Satar is one of three Taliban Commanders responsible for the murder of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) employee on 27 March 2003.
- 5. The detainee worked for Mullah Abdul Rahman, a Taliban supporter, who possessed mortars, rocket propelled grenades, launchers, and ammunition. Mullah Rahman may have been involved in the rocket attacks against United States forces in the Khowst province.
- 6. Mullah Abdul Rahman is responsible for recruiting Pakistanis for various attacks against the transitional Islamic state of Afghanistan (TISA) and United States Forces in Afghanistan. Rahman recruited these individuals to support Taliban and al Qaida activities in Afghanistan.
- 7. The detainee admitted he worked for the Taliban and was the head of security in the Baghlan Province. The detainee was in charge of guarding a house which served as a stopping point for Taliban troops to rest and eat before going to the front lines.

e. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was arrested during the month of December, 2001, by the Northern Alliance and imprisoned at Sheber-ghan prison.
- 2. It was estimated that there were approximately 1300 to 1500 possible al Qaida and Taliban linked detainees in the prison in or near Sheberghan, Afghanistan. Many of the prisoners have stated that, if released, they would directly return to fighting against United States and coalition forces in Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee has been cited for harassing guards by pointing to pictures of what appeared to be planes and buildings on his bunk. The detainee would gesture for the Military Police to look at the planes and then the detainee would use his hands to represent the plane crashing into a building. The detainee would then smile and look at the guard. Additionally, the detainee has been cited for spitting on two prison block guards.
- 4. The detainee received two million Afghani from Mullah Akhund Berader for his leg which had been blown off by a mortar that landed in his compound.
 - 5. Mullah Akhund Berader was the Taliban Corps Commander in Kabul, Afghanistan.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YACOUB, MOHAMMED

- 6. The detainee said he received approximately four million Afghani from Mullah Satar for compensation for his lost leg.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied being the Commander of Intelligence and Police for the Baghlan Province, Afghanistan. He stated he never held a high position for the Taliban and he was just a foot soldier.
- b. The detainee said he joined the Taliban in retaliation to his family. He said he had some family problems and did not want to live anymore and felt he could die by joining the Taliban. The detainee said this was the only reason he joined the Taliban and that he had no intentions on fighting against the U.S.
- c. The detainee related if he were to return to Afghanistan, he would like the opportunity to work with the American government to help rebuild his community.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 April 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: WAHAB, ABDUL

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF WAHAB, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment

During his confinement, the detainee has committed a hostile act, an assault and has had one incident of failure to comply.

- b. Connections / Associations
- 1. The detainee was captured 10 February 2003 at a checkpoint north of Lejay, Baghran District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan based on suspicion that he was one of a number of men who had just engaged United States Forces.
- 2. The detainee appeared to cache weapons prior to capture, as did all of the men he was captured with.
- 3. Two individuals who were captured during a sweep of the Lejay ambush area admitted to participating in the ambush against United States Forces.
- 4. The detainee was captured with an individual who operated an intelligence collection network in support of a former Taliban Chief of Intelligence.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF WAHAB, ABDUL

- 5. The detainee was captured with a Taliban Commander who attended a meeting of senior Taliban officials to discuss military operations against the Afghan Interim Administration.
- 6. The detainee was captured with an individual who was scheduled to meet with other Taliban leaders to discuss the upcoming jihad against the coalition and the Afghanistan Transitional Authority.
- 7. An individual has repeatedly tasked the detainee with transporting money from his village to Baghran.
 - 8. The individual is a Taliban sub-commander.
 - 9. The detainee's brother fought for Jamaat-I-Islami in the Jihad.
- 10. Jamaat-E-Islami is a political party in Pakistan made up of Islamic extremists. The party's leader has a relationship with Usama Bin Laden.
 - c. Intent

The detainee stated he used "klash-n-krors" (sic) against U.S. personnel.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee claims not to know any of the other men who were in his taxi when he was captured.
- b. The detainee stated that none of the people in the taxi either possessed or disposed of weapons.
- c. The detainee denies that he was a member of the Taliban and insists he was nothing more than a farmer.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office fo^ the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

02 May 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL SALEH, ABDUL

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SALEH, ABDUL

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee states that he answered a fatwa telling young men to go to Afghanistan and fight with the Taliban.
- 2. The detainee traveled from Yemen to a Taliban office in Quetta, Pakistan and then to the School for the Jihad in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee admitted that he was a fighter with the Taliban and not a guard as he initially stated.
 - 4. The detainee fought on the frontline at Khogajar against the Northern Alliance.
 - b. Training
- 1. The detainee stated he did not receive any military training in Afghanistan, since he had received approximately six months weapons training while in the Yemeni military.
- 2. According to the detainee, weapons training with the Yemeni National Police was limited to firing six rounds on a Kalishnikov.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SALEH, ABDUL

3. The detainee received training at a well known al Qaida training camp.

c. Connections

- 1. One of the detainee's known aliases was on a list of captured documents recovered from suspected al Qaida safehouse raids.
 - 2. The detainee was assigned to unit that reported to Abdel Salaam Al Hadramy.
- 3. Abd Al-Salaam Al-(Hadrami) was in charge of the Arab fighters who served on the defensive line and was the second in command for all Arab fighters who served in the defensive positions north of Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - 4. Abd Al-Salaam Al-(Hadrami) is a Yemeni al Qaida member.

d. Intent

- 1. The detainee was in northern Afghanistan, at Tejek, fighting with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
- 2. The detainee stated that the men he fought with were issued Kalishnikov rifles, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG's), PK machine guns and hand grenades.

e. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee surrendered at Mazir-e-Sharif and was taken to Qalai Janghi Prison.
- 2. The detainee was present and wounded during the Qalai Janghi prison riot at Mazir-e-Sharif.
 - 3. The detainee was eventually arrested by United States forces at the Qalai Janghi Castle.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied knowing any al Qaida and said he never fought against any Americans.
- b. The detainee feels that the Taliban cheated him because he was fighting the Northern Alliance which was not a cause that he believed in therefore, it was not really a jihad for him.
- c. If released, the detainee plans to go back to Yemen and get married. He will disregard anyone who suggests that he fight jihad. He feels that it was a stupid idea to follow the fatwa.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SALEH, ABDUL

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 April 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: LNU, AZMULLAH

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LNU, AZMULLAH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. In March 2003, the detainee was involved in a foiled reconnaissance mission, coordinated by an al Qaida Southern Afghanistan Regional commander, who is also known as a facilitator.
- 2. The detainee was a Madrassa student in Afghanistan for most of his life, including the timeframe during the Taliban rule.
- 3. The detainee was at the Lakan Madrassa located in Lakan, Khowst Province, Afghanistan.
- 4. Several anti-coalition members have been identified as having been students of the Laken/Dari Madrassa.
 - b. Training

The detainee's mother stated that he attended a training camp in Pakistan. Although, the detainee denied this, he did admit to loving his mother more than the men who trained him.

c. Connections/Associations

Page 1 of 2 .

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LNU, AZIMULLAH

- 1. The detainee was part of a group that included an individual from the Nazamia Madrassa and a known al Qaida member. Reportedly, the Nazamia Madrassa has been used by al Qaida, Taliban and Hizb-I Islam Gulbuddin (HIG) personnel for training. The detainee, along with the other members of the group, were ordered by a known al Qaida facilitator to go to a burial ground, where Muslims go to pray near an operating base in Khost Province, Afghanistan, in order to film the base and surrounding areas.
- 2. The detainee acted as a guide for a group that had weapons, surveillance equipment (cameras and binoculars) and radios.
- 3. One of the individuals the detainee was with as part of the group, used a video camera to take pictures of checkpoints and the airport.
 - 4. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin has long established ties with Bin Ladin.
- 5. The detainee was arrested for aiding personnel in operations against the Salerno Fire Base.
- 6. The detainee was captured, after the group that he was traveling with was engaged in a gunfight with the Afghan Militia Force (AMF).
 - d. Other Relevant Data
- 1_I The detainee was deceptive and combative in his answers, while trying to claim that he was being totally honest and cooperative.
 - 2. The detainee changed portions of his story, especially in relation to his capture.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he has never had any military service and was never taught to use the Kalishnikov.
- b. The detainee denies ever swearing Bia-at to any person or organization. He denies having ever been involved in any Jihad. In addition, the detainee stated he does not know of any Fatwah's that have ever been issued by any Eman (Religious Leader).
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense j Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of 1 Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cii

04 March 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL HARBI, TARIQ SHALLAH HASAN // AL ALAWI

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL HARBI, TARIQ SHALLAH HASAN // AL ALAWI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. Through the internet, the detainee read about a fatwa issued by Sheik Hamood al Okla. The fatwa stated every Muslim should go to Afghanistan (AF) to fight the Northern Alliance troops. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan in order to obey the fatwa.
- 2. Sheik Hamud al Uqqla is a Saudi Mufti who issued fatwas, including a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan, and encouraged people to fight Jihad against Christians and Jews. Al Uqqla condoned the 11 Sep 01 attacks against the United States. In addition, he helped raise money for Usama Bin Laden until his death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.
- 3. In June 2001, the detainee voluntarily traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan for the purpose of fighting the Northern Alliance.

b. Training

1. The detainee was captured with a Casio F-91W watch. This model has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, TARIQ SHALLAH HASAN // AL ALAWI

- 2. After arriving in Afghanistan, the detained at the al Farouq training camp.
- 3. At the al Farouq training camp, he received training on the Kalashnikov rifle and pistols.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. Detainee name was on a list of names of captured Mujahidin found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member. The hard drive was seized on 1 March 2003 in Pakistan.
- 2. Detainee's name was found on a file recovered from a computer server hard drive seized in a suspected Al Qaida safehouse in Pakistan. His name was part of a list of Arabs incarcerated in Pakistan. The data was recorded sometime between 31 March 2001 and 22 January 2002.
- 3. The detainee's name was found on a document retrieved in Afghanistan in March 2002. The document listed the names of Al Qaida martyrs, those missing in action, those imprisoned, and those who had escaped to Pakistan.
- 4. In Quetta, Pakistan, detainee met some Taliban on the street who led the detainee to a guesthouse in Qandahar, where he stayed for a week of questioning and was then sent to the "Faruk camp" for training.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was apprehended by Pakistani police when he attempted to cross the Pakistani border. He was then transferred to U.S. custody.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee ended his training at al Farouq early because he disagreed with the training.
- b. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL HARBI, TARIQ SHALLAH HASAN // AL ALAWI

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 April 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL UMARI, MUSA ALI SAID AL SAID

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UMARI, MUSA ALI SAID AL SAID

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee saw papers with fatwas issued by Sheiks on bulletin boards around the city and in the mosques. The fatwas called for Saudi Arabian citizens to travel to Afghanistan and help the Taliban.
- 2. A man who had fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan told detainee about fighting on the front and information about how to get to Afghanistan.
- 3. That man provided detainee approximately 8,000 Riyals to take to Afghanistan. In addition, the detainee took approximately 4,000 Riyals of his own money.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee went with Mohammed Abdul Razzaq to a Taliban center called Umar al Saif, located on the outskirts of Kabul.
- 2. Abdul Razzaq ((Mohammed)), a Saudi Arabian national living in Pakistan, facilitated travel through Pakistan to Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UMARI, MUSA ALI SAID AL SAID

3. 'Imar al Saifjwas identified as reserve camp. Activities at this camp included small arms traiming, medical care and guard duty.

c. Connection/Association

- 1. The detainee stayed at a Taliban house a few minutes from the Pakistan/Afghanistan border with five Afghans. One of the Afghans, Mohammed Abdul Razzaq, told the detainee that if he wanted to meet up with other Arabs, the detainee could either go to Kandahar or Kabul. The detainee had heard about the Kabul front, so he decided to go there.
 - 2. The detainee stayed at a Taliban house in a small village outside of Kabul.
- 3. The detainee spent about two weeks at the Umar al Saif Center, then was moved to a supply center called Said. He spent about a month and a half, loading trucks and supplies.
- 4. One of detainee's known aliases was on a list of captured al Qaida members that was discovered on a computer hard drive associated with suspected al Qaida.
- 5. One of detainee's aliases was in another hard drive believed to belong to members of the suspected al Qaida cell involved with the October 2002 attack, on US Marines in Faylaka Island.
- 6. Detainee's name was recovered on a hard drive belonging to a senior al Qaida operational planner, Khalid Sheik Mohammed.

d. Intent

- 1. During the detainee's travel from Qatar to Afghanistan, he told another passenger that he was going to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban.
- 2. Detainee states that he traveled to Afghanistan at the end of March 2001, was issued a Kalishnikov rifle, and was assigned to a position called Suhail about 700m from the frontlines.
 - 3. While at the Suhail center, detainee dug trenches and laid barbed wire.
 - 4. The detainee fought on the Bagram frontline.
- 5. The detainee retreated to Jalalabad with other Taliban fighters. They traveled through the mountains for about 20 days and eventually came to the Pakistan border where they turned in their weapons.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UMARI, MUSA ALI SAID AL SAID

- a. The detainee stated that while in Afghanistan, he never participated in any military actions or affiliations of any type with the Taliban. He knows no one who is or has claimed to be with al Qaida, nor has anyone ever asked him to join the Taliban or al Qaida.
- b. The detainee stated that his only activities, while he was in Afghanistan, were to visit local mosques and teach the Koran.
- c. The detainee had initially provided the story that he fought with the Taliban. He did this because Pakistani authorities informed him, that if he told the truth about performing missionary work with the Jamaat Tabligh, the Saudi Delegation would not help him.
- d. The detainee is willing to return to Saudi Arabia and forget about the bad times he had while confined. He would try not to have bad feelings against the United States.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 April 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: SULAYMAN, ABDUL RAHMAN ABDUL // ABU GHIYTH

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

SULAYMAN, ABDUL RAHMAN ABDUL // ABU GHIYTH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee was recruited by Abu Khalud to travel from Yemen to Afghanistan via Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan in March 2001. Khalud arranged for the detainees travel and provided him with 100 United States dollars. Khalud also mentioned the Jihad in Afghanistan, particularly, the fight against Masood.
- 2. Ibrahim ((Balaalawi)), aka Abu Khulud, was a facilitator in Taiz, Yemen. Abu Khulud migrated to Afghanistan with his family in 1997. Abu Khulud swore bayat to Usamma Bin Laden and returned to Yemen in 2000 and was jailed for suspected involvement in the USS Cole bombing. Abu Khulud returned to Afghanistan circa April 2001 and swore bayat to Usamma Bin Laden a second time. Abu Khulud also attended Khalden camp and was in charge of the Kandahar guesthouse.
- 3. While in Quetta, Pakistan, the detainee went to the Dfter house, which his recruiter identified as a Taliban house.
 - 4. The detainee traveled to Kabul where he stayed in the house of Hamza al Qaiti.

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UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SUBJECT: REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULAYMAN, ABDUL RAHMAN ABDUL // ABU GHIYTH

- 5. The Hamza Qaiti guesthouse was owned and operated by al Qaida.
- 6. After the United States began bombing operations in Afghanistan, the detainee traveled to "waiting points" which were staging areas behind the front lines where final preparations were made prior to going to battle.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee became familiar with the Kalishnykovs in Yemen where he did some target practice.
 - 2. The detainee was reportedly trained on the PK machine gun and the 82 mm mortar.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee was identified from a 2000 video of Tarnak Farms, as a trainer in 82mm and 120 mm mortars. This individual also recalls seeing the detainee at the Bagram front, Afghanistan in May-June 2001.
- 2. A senior al Qaida lieutenant stated that the detainee looked familiar to him, but he was unable to recall identifying information.
- 3. The detainee was identified as a Taliban prison guard who used torture techniques on inmates under his control.
- 4. The detainee's name and alias appear on a list of al Qaida members that was discovered on a computer hard drive seized during raids on al Qaida safe houses in Pakistan.
- 5. The detainee's alias (Muhsin al Ta'zi) was found on a document associated with the London based Islamic Observation Center, which listed 76 individuals who were fighting with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
- 6. The Islamic Observation Center located in London, England is headed by a well-known Sunni extremist, who propagandizes widely for extremist and terrorist organizations.
- 7. The detainee was identified as an al Qaida spokesman and was part of Usama Bin Laden's entourage in January 2002 during the escape from Tora Bora.

d. Intent

1. The detainee was on the front lines fighting in Afghanistan during the bombing campaign.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULAYMAN, ABDUL RAHMAN ABDUL // ABU GHIYTH

- 2. The detainee was captured with a model F-91W Casio watch.
- 3. The Casio watch (model F-91 W) has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
 - 4. The detainee stated to the guards that he knows Kung Fu and that he is a Taliban soldier.
 - e. Other Relevant Data

When the detainee turned himself over to the Pakistanis, he did not have his passport.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he did not go to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban. His purpose was to find a wife and get a house.
- b. The detainee denied any association with Usama Bin Laden, al Qaida, the Taliban or the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001.
- c. If released from U.S. custody, the detainee stated he would like to go back to Yemen, secure some type of employment, and start a family.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

07 March 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL S AMIRI, BADER AL BAKRI

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SAMIRI, BADER AL BAKRI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee is a Saudi Arabian citizen who traveled to Afghanistan via Lahore, Pakistan; Muthhafer Abad, Pakistan and finally to Afghanistan.
 - 2. The detainee traveled to Muthhafer Abad, Pakistan for weapons training.
 - 3. The detainee went to Afghanistan in the middle of 2001 to fight in the war.
 - 4. The detainee was on the front lines and fired his Kalashnikov rifle.
- 5. The detainee stated that he fired his weapon as he retreated from the airport in Bagram, Afghanistan.
- 6. The detainee fled Bagram with other Taliban forces, to an unidentified location near Jalalabad, where they dug trenches and waited.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADI REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SAMIRI, BAD

7. The detainee stated shrapnel hit him during a United States bombing raid while fighting on the front line against the Northern Alliance.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee attended the Lashkar E Tayyiba training camp in Afghanistan and received training on the Kalashnikov rifle.
- 2. The Lashkar E Tayyiba (LT) ("Army of the Righteous") is listed in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Terrorist Organization Reference Guide as a terrorist organization.
- 3. The detainee's training at the camp consisted of mountain hiking, weapons assembly/disassembly, and weapons firing.
- 4. Weapons training was accomplished on a pistol, a Kalashnikov rifle, and a German-made G-3 rifle.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee's name was found on a list of al Qaida mujahidin and the contents of their "trust" accounts found on files recovered from various computer media seized during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Pakistan.
- 2. Specifically, the detainee's name was found on a listing of 324 Arabic names recovered from safe house raids in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 3. The detainee's name was on a list of 78 associates incarcerated in Pakistan. The list was found on a computer server hard drive recovered in a suspected al Qaeda safe house.

d. Intent

- 1. The detainee stated he would follow any sort of religious decree stating that an attack on the United States was needed for the sake of Islam.
- 2. The detainee stated it is the duty of true Muslims to defend Islam against infidels, calling (his interviewers) infidels, and stating that everyone must either become a Muslim, pay a

fee for not converting, or be put to death.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SAMIRI, BADER AL BAKRI

- 3. The detainee stated that he would buy weapons to fight anyone who would have alliances with the United States.
- 4. When asked about the attacks on 9/11, the detainee replied, "some time terrorist people have to die."
 - e. Other relevant data

The detainee threatened to kill a guard's family, told multiple guards he would kill them, spit on the guards, threw urine on a guard, and threatened to throw feces on the guards.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee claimed to have traveled to Afghanistan in order to live under true Islamic Law.
- b. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to visit and sightsee and just happened to be asked to help the Taliban.
- c. Detainee traveled to Afghanistan for the sole purpose of sightseeing. He was taken to the front line because he was told it was a great spot to sightsee due to the fighting that was occurring. The detainee claimed he did not know who was fighting or the cause of the fighting.
- d. The detainee traveled to Pakistan to purchase hashish at low prices. The hashish was for his own consumption and for resale in Saudi Arabia.
- e. The detainee stated he knew LT was a pro-Islamic organization which conducted fundraising and other charitable programs. He had no knowledge that they conducted any military activities.
- f. The detainee claimed he never picked up a weapon during the two months he spent on the front lines.
 - g. The detainee denied being a member of al Qaida.
- h. The detainee denied having any prior knowledge of the 11 Sep attacks on the United States, or knowledge of plans for future attacks on the United States.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SAMIRL BADER AL BAKRI

- i. The detainee stated that he would not participate in an attack on the United States because he did not want to be in jail.
- j. The detainee stated that he has nothing against the United States and he would not participate even if the Saudi government issued a fatwa. He also would not participate if an NGO issued a fatwa because he does not feel negatively about the United States.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 April 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL ASADI, MOHAMMED AHMED ALI

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ASADI, MOHAMMED AHMED ALI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan in March 2001 to fight the Jihad.
 - 2. The detainee was a guard at the "AMR" Center for the Taliban.
- 3. There were six rooms at the AMR Center House. One of the rooms was used exclusively for weapons storage.
 - 4. The detainee was in Afghanistan during the U.S. bombing campaign.
- 5. For about a month and a half, the detainee fought with a group, consisting mostly of Pakistanis, that was associated with the Taliban.
 - b. Connection/Associations
 - 1. The detainee stayed at Taliban safe houses.
 - 2. The detainee's travel to Afghanistan was arranged by the Taliban.
 - 3. While at the Taliban embassy in Pakistan the detainee told Taliban officials that he was

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ASADI, MOHAMMED AHMED ALI

there for the Jihad.

- 4. The detainee's immediate supervisor worked for Salam.
- 5. Salam was one of the leaders at the Kabul front during the fighting with the Northern Alliance. Salam was also in charge of mine clearing operations.
 - c. Intent

The detainee was issued a Kalashnikov at the "AMR" center.

- d. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee, along with a large group of Arabs who had fled Afghanistan, was arrested by the police in Pakistan.
 - 2. The detainee admits he had handled weapons and was experienced with a Kalashnikov.
 - 3. During capture, the detainee had in his possession a Casio F-91W Watch.
- 4. The Casio F-91 W has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
- 4. The following primary factor favor release or transfer:

The detainee denied being a member of al Qaida. The detainee claimed not to know that the Taliban were fighting against the Northern Alliance/Americans. The detainee also claimed not to know what a Taliban was prior to his capture.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 April 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: ALHANASHI, MOHAMMAD AHMED// ABDULLAH SALEH

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL HANASHI, MOHAMMAD AHMED // ABDULLAH SALEH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan in March or April 2001. He traveled to Afghanistan (AF) from Yemen via air to Dubai, United Arab Emirates (TC) and Karachi, Pakistan (PK); bus to Quetta, PK and Kandahar, AF, then taxi to Kabul, AF.
- 2. The detainee did not have money to obtain a passport. Sa'ed paid for the detainee's passport, airline tickets and obtained the visas.
- 3. Sa'ed facilitated travel from Yemen to Afghanistan and subsequently served as a front line commander in the front lines north of Kabul. Sa'ed held a position subordinate to Abdel Hadi Al-Iraqi.
- 4. The detainee stayed at both Taliban and Jama Tablique guesthouses while en route to Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 5. Jama'at Al Tablighi is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HANASHI, MOHAMMAD AHMED // ABDULLAH SALEH

- 6. The detainee joined the Taliban while in Afghanistan.
- 7. The detainee fought on the front lines against the Northern Alliance.

b. Training

- 1. Ghailani identified the detainee as being present at the al-Faruq Training Camp in Afghanistan where he underwent basic training in 1998 to 1999 before moving on to the front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 2. Ghailani is a Tanzanian al-Qaida operative who has been indicted in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

c. Connection/Associations

- 1. The detainee was associated with a high level al Qaida commander, Abdul Hadi Al-Iraqi.
- 2. (('Abd Al-Hadi Al-Iraqi)) was a veteran Afghan fighter who was the head of the Kabul, Afghanistan guesthouse named Khan Ghulam Bashah and who later took charge of the Northern front in Kabul in 2000.
 - 3. The detainee fought under the leadership of Abdul Salam.
- 4. Abdul Salaam was one of the leaders at the Kabul front during the fighting with the Northern Alliance. He was also in charge of mine clearing operations.
- 5. Detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from a safe house associated with suspected al-Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.
 - 6. Usama Bin Laden spoke to the detainee's group while they were in Tora Bora.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was captured at Mazar-e-Sharif.
- 2. The detainee was captured with 400 U.S. dollars. Mu'Amar Sa'ed Dayan, aka Jabir, gave the detainee his wallet before he died. Inside the wallet was Dayan's last will and 400 U.S. dollars.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HANASHI, MOHAMMAD AHMED // ABDULLAH SALEH

- a. The detainee readily admits to having fought for the Taliban, but noted that it was never his intention or desire to fight against the U.S.
- b. The detainee affirmed he had never seen Usama Bin Laden and that he had never been to Tora Bora as previously stated.
- c. The detainee advised he was not trained on weapons in Afghanistan as he already knew how to operate a Kalishnakov (AK-47) and how to handle hand grenades when he lived in Yemen.
 - d. The detainee considers himself devout, but added that he is not a religious fanatic.
 - e. The detainee denies any involvement with al Qaida.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enem Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL RABDESH, YUSEF ABDULLAH //SALEH

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL RABIESH, YUSEF ABDULLAH // SALEH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee stated he financed his own trip to Afghanistan.
 - 2. The detainee surrendered to the Northern Alliance at Konduz. 4 f
- 3. The detainee and others were issued arms and told to guard two valleys near the front lines.
 - b. Training

The detainee received Kalashnikov, PK, and grenade training at a Taliban training camp in Talukan, Afghanistan.

- c. Connection/Associations
 - 1. The detainee is a member of the Taliban.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RABIESH, YUSEF ABDULLAH // S ALEH

- 2. The detainee stayed at multiple Taliban guesthouses while traveling in the cities of Kandahar, Kabul, and Talukan. μ A^{\wedge}
- 3. The detainee knew the Yemeni leader of an element of foreign fighters approximately 100 strong.
- 4. The detainee's information was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

d. Intent

- 1. Source decided to go to Afghanistan after learning about the conflict on internet sites. He read about fatwas issued by Shiek Ibin (Jibril) and Sheik Hamud al Ukla. Both fatwas called on Saudis to help the Taliban with money or service.
- 2. Sheikh Hamoud al Uqqla is a Saudi Mufti who issued fatwas, including a fatwa calling for Jihad in Afghanistan, and encouraged people to fight Jihad against Christians and Jews. Al Uqqla condoned the 11 Sep 01 attacks against the United States. In addition, he helped raise money for Usama Bin Laden until his death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.

e. Other Relevant Data

- 1. Detainee was present during the prison uprising in Mazir-E-Sharif.
- 2. The detainee's travel route consisted of leaving Riyadh, Saudi Arabia between May and June of 2001, flying to Bahrain, traveling to Dubai, followed by flying to Karachi, Pakistan followed by flights to Quetta, Pakistan then traveled by ground to Kandahar, Afghanistan. From there he traveled to Kabul and then a final flight to Konduz, Afghanistan upon a Taliban aircraft. He then traveled with his brother by taxi to Talukan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied being a Taliban fighter and stated that he did not participate in military operations against the coalition.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL RABIESH, YUSEF ABDULLAH // SALEH

b. The detainee reported that the story he originally provided during his detainment in Kandahar, Afghanistan (AF) and in Cuba was fictional, based on bits of information the detainee had heard from his brother's own experiences in Afghanistan. The detainee stated that during his time in Shabragan prison, (AF) he observed other prisoners that were beaten by the Afganis because they were denying any Taliban involvement Detainee did not want to be beaten by them as well, so he provided the minimal information he felt was needed to assure his own safety.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 Apr 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL KHALIF, HANI SAIID MOHAMMAD

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALIF, HANI SAIID MOHAMMAD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee, a Saudi Arabian citizen, traveled to Afghanistan in November of 2000 to fight in the jihad. He paid for his own travel with savings from his job at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs.
 - 2. The detainee told the Taliban that he was there to fight in the jihad.
- 3. The detainee decided on his own that it was his duty as a Muslim to join the jihad in defense of other Muslims.
- 4. The detainee traveled from Riyadh through Jordan to Damascus, Syria. He then took an Iranian Air Flight from Damascus to Tehran, Iran and then onto Mashed, Iran. He then crossed into Afghanistan from Mashed.
- 5. This is a travel route for the movement of jihad volunteers from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan.

b. Training

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALIF, HANI SAIID MOHAMMAD

- 1. While in the Saudi Army, the detainee learned to use a 9mm pistol and a Hechler & Koch G-3 assault rifle.
- 2. The detainee was trained to use the Kalishnikov rifle, the PK machine gun, the 9mm pistol, and rocket-propelled grenades while at the Farouq camp. He also had physical training, learned to read maps, dig trenches, and use camouflage techniques.
- 3. The detainee trained at al Farouq in the detection, avoidance, disarming, and displacement of various antitank and antipersonnel mines.
- 4. The detainee trained in the use and maintenance of the 82mm mortar near Konduz, Afghanistan.

c. Associations

- 1. Detainee seems to know another detainee well.
- 2. That detainee was the acting Taliban Governor of Mazar-e-Sharif.
- 3. Upon arrival in Afghanistan, detainee stayed at a guesthouse.
- 4. The guesthouse was managed by a close personal friend of Mullah Omar.
- 5. The guesthouse manager sent the detainee to an Arab guesthouse in Kandahar.
- 6. An al Qaida facilitator knew the detainee as Haydarah Salim Al-Libi.
- 7. Haydarah Al-Libi was in charge of logistics for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 8. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has designated the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group as a foreign terrorist organization.

d. Intent

- 1. After finishing training in early 2001, the detainee was sent to the frontlines at Kabul, Afghanistan, and fought there for five or six months.
- 2. The detainee was then sent north to the frontlines near Konduz, Afghanistan, and fought there for about five months until his capture in late 2001.
- 3. The detainee was captured in late 2001 by General Dostum's Northern Alliance Forces near Mazir-e-Sharif, after the U.S. bombing campaign of the Konduz region had started.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALIF, HANI SAIID MOHAMMAD

- 4. The detainee stated he would only wage jihad against the United States if the United States was involved in killing Muslims.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. During the Gulf war, the detainee fought side by side with the United States Marines in Saudi Arabia.
- b. The detainee said he has never been an enemy of the United States, nor has he supported any efforts against them.
- c. The detainee said he left Saudi Arabia to fight the jihad long before Americans were in Afghanistan. If he were released, the detainee would like to get a job, start a family and have a normal life.
 - d. Detainee denies any affiliation with al Qaida and denies knowing anyone from al Qaida.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 March 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: SAYAB, MUTIJ SADIZ AHMAD

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAYAB, MUTIJ SADIZ AHMAD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Training

The detainee admits receiving small arms training on the assembly and disassembly of the AK-47 rifle near Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

- b. Connections/Associations
- 1. In June 2001, the detainee provided an al Qaida facilitator with his Belgian passport and 6,000 French Francs who purchased (the detainee) a plane ticket and Pakistan visa for travel to Islamabad, Pakistan.
- 2. Detainee's travel to London enroute to Afghanistan was facilitated by an Algerian in Kritay, France.
 - -The Algerian is connected to, or possibly a member of the al Qaida network.
 - 3. The detainee stayed in an Algerian safehouse in Jalalabad commanded by Jafar.

-Omar Chaabani (aka Ja'far) operated an extremist network which ran a transit center that was activated and financed by Usama Bin Ladin.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAYAB, MUTJJ SADIZ AHMAD

c. Intent

- 1. The detainee, an Algerian citizen, admitted to traveling from France through London, England; to Pakistan, and to an Algerian safe house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan; and finally to Kabul, Afghanistan a couple of weeks before September 11,2001.
- 2. The detainee purchased a fraudulent Belgian passport for 2,500 French Francs (approximately \$300 U.S.).
- 3. The detainee utilized the fraudulent Belgian passport to enter France and England, and enroute to Afghanistan.
 - d. Other Relevant Data
 - 1. Two weeks after September 11,2001, the detainee fled to Pakistan and was arrested.
 - 2. Without prompting, the detainee knew in detail of the September 11,2001 attacks.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated that at no point during his travels to Afghanistan was he ever approached for the purpose of fighting Jihad.
 - b. The detainee stated that he was never approached to attend any sort of training camp.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 April 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL HATAYBI, ABDUL RAHMAN NASHI // BADI

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL HATAYBI, ABDUL RAHMAN NASHI // BADI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee departed Saudi Arabia sometime after July or August 2001 for Afghanistan via the United Arab Emirates.
- 2. The detainee's trip to Afghanistan was arranged and paid for by a recruiter for the Taliban and al Qaida.
 - b. Training
 - 1. The detained at al Qaida's al Farouq paramilitary camp.
 - 2. The detainee received training in the AK-47, Makarov pistol and M-16.
 - c. Connection/Associations
 - 1. The detainee was identified as a member of al Qaida by a foreign government service.
 - 2. The detainee is a member of Jama'at al Tablighi. 1

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVEREVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HATAYBI, ABDUL RAHMAN NASHI // BADL

- 3. Jama'at al Tablighi, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
 - 4. The detainee resided at an al Qaida safehouse in Kandahar.
- 5. One of the detainee's known aliases was on a list of captured al Qaida members that was discovered on a computer hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.
- 6. The detainee's name was found on a computer hard drive recovered in a suspected al Qaida safe house. The list contained personnel incarcerated in Pakistan.
- 7. The detainee's name was listed on a document that contained information regarding the capture of Taliban and al Qaida fighters who had crossed the Pakistan border after the 11 September 2001 retaliatory attacks by the United States.
- 8. The detainee's name was found on documentation confiscated from an individual mujahidin who entered Croatia from Bosnia.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
- b. The detainee stated that he traveled to Pakistan for the sole purpose of providing missionary work to those individuals in need of assistance.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cu

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL FOUZAN, FAHD MUHAMMED // ABDULLAH

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL FOUZAN, FAHD MUHAMMED // ABDULLAH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan after September 11,2001.
- 2. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia via: Bahrain; Karachi, Pakistan; Quetta, Pakistan; and into Kandahar, Afghanistan. While in Afghanistan, he traveled to Kabul, Khowst, and Jalalabad.
 - 3. The detainee went to Afghanistan for 10 months in 1999.
 - b. Training

The detainee was identified as having attended the Abu Nasir military camp in Afghanistan.

- c. Connection/Associations
 - 1. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida member.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL FOUZAN, FAHD MUHAMMED // ABDULLAH

- 2. The detainee worked for the Al-Harmayn Charitable Institute.
- 3. Al-Harmayn was added on 11 Mar 02 to the list of organizations identified under Executive Order 13224 blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.
- 4. The detainee's name was found on an internet website listing of captured Taliban and al Qaida fighters.
- 5. The above mentioned website's stated goal was to publish the names to place pressure on the home countries and Pakistan to release the "prisoners."
- 6. The detainee's name was found on a list recovered during a raid on a suspected safe house in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 7. One of detainee's known aliases was on a list of captured al Qaida members that was discovered on a computer hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.
- 8. The detainee's name was recovered from a collection of miscellaneous letters and other papers in a suspected al Qaida member's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 - d. Other Relevant Data
 - 1. The detainee claims that his passport was stolen while in Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee was designated by the Saudi Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Investigations, (Mabahith), as being a high priority target.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee said if he were released he would go back to Saudi Arabia to continue his laundry business and raise his family.
- b. The detainee has stated Usama Bin Laden was a "bad man", but did not know of him until after the September 11 attacks. While he has no feelings for those lost in the twin towers, he felt sad about the loss of lives. He said those types of attacks are not a good reflection on Muslims.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL FOUZAN, FAHD MUHAMMED // ABDULLAH

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

.30 March 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: ZAHIR, MOHOMMAD

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAHIR, MOHOMMAD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to **a** third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or **a** third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment

Detainee confessed to knowing and working with people involved in Taliban/Anti-Coalition Movement activities and offered to lead soldiers directly to weapons/arms caches.

b. Connections/Associations

- 1. Detainee was captured in July 2003 because of his association with the Taliban. Detainee possessed information associated with weapons caches, arms dealings and Taliban personalities.
- 2. Detainee admitted he worked for the Director of Intelligence for the Taliban government.
- 3. Detainee was employed by the Taliban in the Secret Information Office in Ghazni, Afghanistan. Detainee also performed as a servant to the commanders in Ghazni, Afghanistan, until the fall of the Taliban.
 - 4. Detainee was captured in the same raid as another detainee.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAHIR, MOHOMMAD

- 5. The other detainee, with whom the detainee was captured, was the Chief of Logistics for a Taliban owned cooperative company. The company provided logistical support directly to the Taliban government and was closely associated with Taliban Intelligence.
- 6. The detainee went to Iran when the Taliban were exiled and the new government was getting organized.
- 7. Detainee was captured with a fax from a newspaper in Iran. The fax was requesting that Qari ((Ahmedullah)) interview Usama Bin ((Laden)) and included a list of questions related to the September 11,2001.
 - 8. Qari Ahmadullah was the former Chief of Intelligence for the Taliban.

c. Intent

Detainee was captured with a map of San Manuel, Cuba, phone books with entries of personnel in a U.S. government terrorist tracking cell, business cards, passports and pictures.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he has not been associated with the Taliban since his conscription first ended.
- b. The detainee stated he never plotted against coalition forces, or the new government in Afghanistan.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense) Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 March 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: ALAWFI, MAZINSALIHMUSAID

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AWFI, MAZIN SALIH MUSAID

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. Detainee stated that he traveled to Afghanistan for Jihad and fought with the Taliban in Kabul from June-December 2001.
 - 2. Detainee stated he paid, with his own money, the expenses for the trip to Afghanistan.
- 3. Detainee was captured on the Pakistan border, by border guards and processed into United States custody in Kandahar.
- 4. The detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan via Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Damam, Saudi Arabia; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Karachi, Pakistan; Quetta, Pakistan; and Kandahar, Afghanistan. From Kandahar, he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - b. Training
- 1. The detainee stated that he was trained by the Saudi Arabian General Security Service in small arms and unit tactics, thus he did not need further training from the Taliban.
 - 2. Detainee was at the al Farouq training camp.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AWFI, MAZIN SALIH MUSAID

c. Connection

- 1. The detainee's name and telephone number were on a list of al Qaida members discovered on a computer hard drive seized during raids on al Qaida safe houses in Pakistan.
 - 2. The detainee's name and contact number were known to al Qaida.
- 3. The detainee's uncle is a terrorist wanted for bombing attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in May 2003, and has been linked to an al Qaida weapons storage and document forging facility.
 - 4. The detainee was at the Nebras guest house in Kandahar.
- This guest house was used by fighters heading to the al Farouq training camp and by Usama Bin Laden.

d. Intent

The detainee stated he offered to help the Taliban.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee, at capture, had in his possession a Casio watch, model # F-91W, which has been used in bombings linked to al Qaida.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. When asked what his plans are for the future when he returns home, detainee stated:
 - 1) Make up for the disappointment he has caused to his parents; 2) Help his (family's) brothers and sisters, 3) Get married and 4) Obtain a good job, possibly a government job or some other job of importance.
- b. When asked about his opinion about America, the detainee said that there were some good and some bad Americans, just as there is everywhere. There are some Americans that he would like to have as friends and some he would not like to have as friends.
- c. The detainee claims to have bought his Casio watch years before he left Afghanistan and did not know where he bought it specifically.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 March 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: AL TAYABI, ABDULLAH

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL TAYABI, ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee, a Saudi Arabian citizen, voluntarily traveled from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan via Dubai, UAE and Karachi, Pakistan, in August 2001.
 - 2. The detainee was captured near the Pakistan border.
 - b. Training
 - 1. The detainee received weapons training at the al Farouq Training Camp.
- 2. The detainee received familiarization with the Kalishnikov rifle and a pistol at a house in which he stayed in Kandahar.
- 3. The detainee traveled to another training camp near Jalalabad, Afghanistan, after al Farouq, but the training was cancelled due to the war.
 - c. Connection / Association
- 1. The detainee's name was on a list of captured mujahidin found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL TAYABI, ABDULLAH

- The detainee's name was on a list of al Qaida Mujahidin and the contents of their "trust" accounts found on computer media recovered during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses.
- 3. The detainee joined Abu Thabet's group that was crossing the mountains heading for the Pakistani border.
 - 4. Abu Thabit fought for the al Qaida terrorist organization.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated that after he was captured, he was forced to admit to things that were not true. He is not associated with al Qaida.
- b. The detainee stated that he never went to al Farouq training camp. He stated that his statements were made due to pressure from the Afghani's. September 11th happened about two weeks after he was in Afghanistan.
- c. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan during his vacation from school to obtain weapons training. He purchased a return ticket intending to only stay in Afghanistan for a month.
- d. The detainee stated he applied to King Fahd military school for training but they refused him because he looked weak. This is why he sought training in Afghanistan.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 April 2005

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From: Presiding Officer

To: GHALAAB BASHIR

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHALAAB BASHIR

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee traveled from Syria, through Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan respectively, finally arriving at Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee was smuggled from Iran into Afghanistan and then on to Quetta, Pakistan with assistance from the Tablighi (JT: Jama'at Tablighi) office in Zahedan, Iran.
- 3. Jama'at Tablighi is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization believed to be used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
 - b. Training

The detainee attended the al Farouq training camp in early 2001.

- c. Connections
 - 1. The detainee was a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHALAAB BASHIR

- 2. The detainee's name was on a list of captured hard drives associated with a senior al Qaida member.
- 3. The detainee's name also appears in a list of "trust" accounts found on files recovered from various computer media seized during raids against al Qaida.

d. Intent

- 1. The detainee left Jalalabad, Afghanistan around November 2001, with other Arabs and Pakistanis, stayed in the mountains for one month, continued to Pakistan with approximately 20 other Arabs, and was captured on 16 December 2001.
- 2. In September 2004, the detainee admitted to using a false name since his arrival in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
- 3. The detainee was in charge of weapons inventory at Tora Bora, with duties consisting of handing out ammunition and taking inventory.
- 4. The detainee was in Tora Bora after 11 September 2001, making sure fighting groups had enough supplies.
- 5. The detainee worked in one of the supply caves, loading and unloading supplies for other mujahideen.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he had "a middle of the road" approach with faith and religion and that he was not an extremist.
 - b. The detainee claims to have not participated in jihad activities.
- c. The detainee denied attending the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan and that he was chosen to be a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. He denied meeting Usama Bin Laden.
 - d. The detainee denied receiving any military or weapons training.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 April 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: JAN, JUMMA

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAN, JUMMA

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee, as a military commander, reportedly was assigned a mission in Tajikistan after 11 September 2001 as part Of an al Qaida and Taliban operational plan.
- 2. The detainee has fought with the Taliban under several commanders. The detainee has also resided with several Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (KG) commanders.
 - 3. HIG has been designated by the United States as a terrorist organization.
- 4. HIG has long-established ties with Usama Bin Laden. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.
- 5. The detainee was captured in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan by coalition forces and was positively identified on 3 July 2003.
 - b. Training

The detainee has been involved in training operatives in the use of explosives and

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAN, JUMMA

improvised explosive devices in order to target United States military personnel.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee was identified as the leader of a compound where approximately 100 Taliban soldiers stayed.
 - 2. The detainee is a high-ranking Taliban member and is a HIG Commander.
 - 3. The detainee admitted he was a driver for Taliban Commander Guli, for one year.
- 4. The detainee is associated with Qarim Boy, a HIG commander and Maulawi Shamsul Haq, who was a security guard for Mullah Mohammad Omar.
 - 5. Mullah Mohammad Omar is the former Taliban Supreme Leader.
 - 6. Maulawi Shamsul Haq was also a former Deputy of the Taliban Party.
- 7. The detainee met with Mulla Zarmai sometime around June 2003. Mulla Zarmai is a former commander to Mullah Omar.

d. Intent

- 1. The detainee was in a leadership role in a rocket attack against United States forces at the Mazar-e-Sharif airfield.
- 2. The detainee has been implicated in the roadside bomb assassination attempt of General Dostum, a Northern Alliance leader.
- 3. The detainee has been involved in the purchase, construction and storage of mines in the Chemtal area of Afghanistan.
 - e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee speaks Farsi, Russian, Uzbecki, Pashto and some English.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. Detained having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.
- b. The detainee stated that if he were released, he would go home, be married to his fiance" and continue on with his life. The detainee stated he had no associations with the Taliban,

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAN, JUMMA

besides being their driver in the past.

- c. The detainee claims he never transported, built or used explosives of any kind.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 March 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: MOHAMED, FAHED NASSER

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR

ADMINISTRATIVEREVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

MOHAMED, FAHED NASSER

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment

The detainee was recruited in December 2000, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, to take part in jihad.

b. Training

The detainee received small arms training at the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan.

- c. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee admitted under duress that he was an al Qaida and had met Usama Bin Laden.
- 2. After arriving in Afghanistan, the detainee worked or stayed in at least five Taliban guesthouses and had knowledge of two other guesthouses.
 - 3. Usama Bin Laden visited the al Farouq training camp while the detainee was in training.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMED, FAHED NASSER

4. The detainee shared a tent with an al Qaida operative while at al Farouq training camp. During that time, they often discussed jihad.

d. Intent

- 1. The detainee traveled from his home in Saudi Arabia to Pakistan and crossed the border in Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee escaped during the second night of the Mazar-e-Sharif uprising, but was shot and recaptured by Northern Alliance soldiers.
- 3. The individual who recruited the detainee said that he could be trained and sent to Palestine to fight in the Jihad. The detainee invited three of his friends from his hometown in Saudi Arabia to go with him.
 - e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee confirmed that he was present during the uprising at the al Jenke Prison in Mazar-e-Sharif.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he has never made bombs or met anyone who manufactures bombs. The detainee denied knowing or associating with any terrorist The detainee also stated he has never collected or been asked to collect information against the United States.
 - b. The detainee stated he was never involved in any fighting in Afghanistan.
 - c. The detainee denied attending a terrorist camp training.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 March 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: ABD AL RAHMAN ABD, ALLAL AB // ALJALLIL

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

ABD AL RAHMAN ABD, ALLAL AB // ALJALLIL

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. In the year 2000, the detainee traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan.
 - 2. In April 2001, the detainee returned to Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee was identified by his alias, as having been on Usama Bin Laden's security detail.
 - b. Training

The detainee received training at the Al Farouq training camp.

- c. Connection/Associations
- 1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to help Ibrahim Aliwee improve the Islamic studies center in Kabul.
 - 2. Ibrahim is a probable member of al Qaida.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

ABD AL RAHMAN ABD, ALLAL AB // ALJALLIL

d. Intent.

The detainee went to the front lines in Kabul.

e. Other Relevant Data

Detainee's overall behavior has been non-compliant and aggressive. Detainee does not comply with guards instruction. Detainee continues to talk between the blocks. Detainee also has multiple occurrences of causing damage in his cell. Detainee has shown by his actions that he has little regard for the rules of the cellblock and does not respect his fellow man.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated he was in Pakistan because Ibrahim, a Yemeni man who was a humanitarian, took him to the hospital there. He was only in Pakistan a short time and did not have time to receive treatment.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 APRIL 2005

From: Presiding Officer

To: HASSEN, MOHAMMED MOHAMMED

Via: Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVEREVIEW

BOARD IN THE CASE OF HASSEN, MOHAMMED MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. An Imam at the Mosque in Taiz, Yemen, the leader of the local Jammat Tablique in Taiz, and the detainees father, arranged the detainee's trip to Pakistan. The detainee's father arranged for his passport, airline tickets, visa and \$1,000 in United States currency.
- 2. The detainee traveled by plane to Lahore, Pakistan through Karachi, Pakistan. Once he arrived in Lahore the detainee took a bus to Raywand, Pakistan where the headquarters of the Tablique Jammat was located. The detainee stayed at the Tablique Jammat mosque.
- 3. Jama'at Al Tablighi, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
- 4. The detainee had a three-month travel visa to Pakistan, but planned on remaining there for approximately one year. He stated he was unconcerned about over staying his visa because renewing the visa was as simple as visiting any police station in Pakistan.
- 5. The detainee was identified as a fighter who traveled between Kandahar and Khost, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HASSEN, MOHAMMED MOHAMMED

b. Training

The detainee was identified as having trained at al Farouq.

- c. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee's father was involved with members of Tablique Jammat and favored the organization.
- 2. A senior al Qaida Lieutenant identified the detainee in a photo as having possibly seen him in Afghanistan.
 - d. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee, a Yemen citizen, traveled to Pakistan in early 2001. He was captured at the Cresent Mill guesthouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan and was identified by a senior al Qaida lieutenant.
- 2. The Crescent Mill guesthouse corresponds to an al Qaida safe house in Faisalabad where a number of suspected al Qaida members were eventually arrested in a raid late March 2002 by the Pakistani police.
- 3. The detainee was arrested in a Pakistani police raid of a house which had harbored known al Qaida members.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denies ever going to Afghanistan. He stated, "I do not know Afghanistan. The only time I was there was when they took me to prison there. The Americans took me to Afghanistan."
- b. The detainee stated he neither served in the Yemeni military nor received any kind of military training. In addition, he stated he did not own a Kalashnikov nor has he ever fired one. The detainee said he never participated in the Hajj and does not follow any fatwas. The detainee stated he did not like what al Qaida and Usama bin Laden did on 11 September 2001. The detainee explained he has no personal knowledge of Al Qaida, Usama Bin Laden or the Taliban.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 March 2005

From: **Presiding Officer**

To: TUKHI, AMINULLAHBARYALAI

Via: **Assisting Military Officer**

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TUKHI, AMINULLAH BARYALAI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee forged documents to facilitate the escape of al Qaida members.
 - b. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee facilitated the travel of individuals from Meshad, Iran to the border town of Tayyebat, Iran, which is near the Afghan border, in 2001,
- 2. The detainee associated with the leader of al Wafa, Abdul Aziz, and received payments for arranging the travel of individuals to and from Afghanistan.
- 3. Al Wafa is a known terrorist organization as directed in Presidential Executive Order 13224.

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